

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE**  
**FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF NIGERIA**  
**IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION**  
**HOLDEN AT APO – ABUJA**  
**ON, 6<sup>TH</sup> JULY, 2021.**  
**BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP:- HON. JUSTICE A. O. OTALUKA.**  
**SUIT NO.:-FCT/HC/CV/2190/19**

**BETWEEN:**

**ANTHONY OTUNU UZI:.....APPLICANT**

**AND**

- 1. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL  
CRIMES COMMISSION.**
- 2. PETER MBAH.**
- 3. ACCESS BANK PLC.  
(FORMALLY DIAMOND BANK PLC).**
- 4. FIRST BANK PLC.**
- 5. FIDELITY BANK PLC.**

**...RESPONDENTS**

Godwin Chukwukere for the Applicant.  
ChikwereAzuwuke for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent.  
MazudaAgboola for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent.  
Mas’udAlabelewe for the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent with HadizaAbubakar, A.D. Atanda,  
Mohammed Suleiman.  
5<sup>th</sup> Respondent not represented.

**JUDGMENT.**

This is a fundamental rights enforcement application filed by the Applicant on the 17<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2019 wherein he is praying the Court for the following reliefs against the Respondents:

1. A declaration that the arrest without warrant and subsequent dehumanization and detention of the Applicant from 2<sup>nd</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> July, 2018, by the operatives of

the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, is illegal, unlawful, wrongful and constitutes a blatant violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights as enshrined in Sections 35(1), (4) & (6), 37, 41(1), 44(1) and 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as altered, Section 1(1) (4) 30(1)(2), & 314(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, and Articles 5, 6 & 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

2. A declaration that the continued freezing, restricting, blocking and or placing a post-no-debit on the accounts of the Applicant without a valid order of a court from July, 2018 till date and detention of the personal properties of the Applicant, without warrant, which were seized from him at the time of his arrest, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2018, till date, by the operatives and officials of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a violent violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights as enshrined in Sections 35(1), (4) & (6), 37, 41(1), 44(1) and 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as altered, Section 1(1) (2) 30(1)(2), & 314(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, and Articles 5, 6 & 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
3. A declaration that the continued placing of restrictions on the Applicant's operation of the said accounts from July, 2018, till date with or without an ex-parte order of a court, and without arraigning the Applicant before a court of law for any known offence, almost one year after investigation, is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a violent violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights as

enshrined in Sections 35(1), (4) & (6), 37, 41(1), 44(1) and 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as altered, Section 1(1) (2) 30(1)(2), & 314(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, and Articles 5, 6 & 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

4. A declaration that the restrictions placed on the accounts of the Applicant by the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents based on the instructions given to the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent without any court order to that effect, thereby denying and depriving the Applicant access to and operation of the said accounts, is illegal, unconscionable, ultra vires and constitutes a breach and blatant violation of the fiduciary relationship between the Applicant and the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, as well as a breach of the Applicant's right to own property as guaranteed by the constitution.
5. A declaration that the acts of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents by conniving together and invaded and printed the accounts statements of the Applicant in the custody of the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents without the knowledge and consent of the Applicant, is illegal, unconscionable, ultra vires and constitutes a breach and blatant violation of the fiduciary relationship between the Applicant and the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, as well as a breach of the Applicant's right to own property as guaranteed by the constitution.
6. A declaration that the arrest and subsequent dehumanization and detention of the Applicant from 2<sup>nd</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> July, 2018, by operatives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent on the alleged Petition/Complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, without granting him bail within 24 hours of his arrest, is illegal,

wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a blatant violation of his fundamental rights as enshrined in Sections 35(1), (4) & (6), 37, 41(1), 44(1) and 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as altered, Section 1(1) (2) 30(1)(2), & 314(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, and Articles 5, 6 & 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

7. A declaration that the continued confiscation and continued detention of the personal properties of the Applicant, without warrant which were seized from him at the time of his arrest, on 2<sup>nd</sup> July, 2018, till date, by operatives and officers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, on the frivolous Petition/Complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a violent violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights as enshrined in Sections 36(5), 37, 41(1), 44(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as altered, (CFRN), Section 1(1) (2), & 314(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (ACJA), and Articles 6 & 14 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
8. A declaration that the demand by operatives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent on the Applicant, to continue to make frequent and periodic appearances and visit to the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent here in Abuja without arraigning him before a court of law, for any known offence, almost one year after investigation, on the frivolous Petition/Complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, of offences alleged against him, is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a blatant violation of his fundamental rights as enshrined in

Sections 35(1), (4) &36(5), and 41(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,as altered, Section 1(1) (2), 30(1)(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, and Articles 6 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.

9. A declaration that the Applicant is entitled to a public apology and adequate compensation from the Respondents as provided for by Sections 35(6)and 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,as altered, Sections314(1) and 323(1)(2) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, for the blatant violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights without following the due process of law.
10. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents whether by themselves, servants, agents, operatives, detectives, investigating officer(s) and privies, howsoever to remove the post-no-debit order and any other restrictions on the accounts of the Applicant and make operational forthwith, the accounts of the Applicant in respect thereof.
11. An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent whether by itself, its agents, employees, operatives, detectives, investigating officer(s), or by whatever name called, from further inviting, arresting or detaining the Applicant on the frivolous Petition/Complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent.
12. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the 1<sup>st</sup>, Respondent to release forthwith to the Applicant, his personal properties i.e. handsets phones with SIM cards, which were seized from him without warrant, at the time of

his arrest, by operatives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2018.

13. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the Respondents to tender a public apology and pay adequate compensation to the Applicant for the blatant violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights without following due process of law.
14. An Order that Respondents jointly and severally pay to the Applicant the sum of N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as exemplary damages for the wanton and grave violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights.
15. And for such further or other orders as the Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.

In the supporting affidavit deposed to by one UsmanSalihu, a Litigation Secretary in the law firm of counsel to the Applicant, the deponent who deposed to the affidavit because according to him, the Applicant has health challenges that could not allow him to travel from Benin to depose to same, averred that the Applicant was at his place of work at Pinnacle Oil and Gas Ltd in Warri, Delta State on 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2018 when the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, the Chief Executive Officer of the Company called him on phone for a routine meeting of the company.

He stated that while the meeting was in progress, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent stepped out to make a phone call, and not long after that, an operative of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent who introduced himself as Mr. David Nkpe, appeared at the venue of the meeting in company of some fully armed operatives, and informed the Applicant and five (5) others that they were under arrest, but failed to show him any warrant for such arrest.

He averred that the Applicant was totally humiliated, dehumanised and terrorized, with the operatives forcibly seizing his phones and prevented him from making any calls to his family members or friends concerning his arrest. That the Applicant was informed that his arrest was based on a petition allegedly written against him and five other of his colleagues by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent.

He further averred that the Applicant and his arrested colleagues were driven by the operatives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondents to their office in Benin where they were detained for three (3) days before they were brought back to Warri where the operatives proceeded to conduct a search on the Applicant's house without showing him any search warrant to that effect. That after the search, the Applicant and his colleagues were driven by the fully armed operatives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to their Benin office where they were detained until the evening of 6<sup>th</sup> July, 2018 when he was released on administrative bail after a period of five(5) days. That during this period of his arrest and detention at 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's Benin Office, the Applicant's statement was not taken until in late July, 2018 when he was invited to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's head office in Abuja along with his five other colleagues – BennethChukwumalhuoma, Kelvin Enabulele, Jar Jonathan, Eze Sunday and Clifford Igbozurike, before his statement was eventually taken.

Furthermore, the deponent averred that the Petition/complaint of Peter Mbah, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent was to the effect that the Applicant and his afore-named five colleagues, conspired and stole a cash sum of One Hundred and Thirty-Five Million Naira (N135,000,000.00) belonging to Pinnacle Oil and Gas Ltd, which allegations are completely false and malicious in their

entirety and only meant to disparage the Applicant's person and forcibly dispossess him of his hard earned resources.

He stated that the Applicant was ordered to report to the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent at Abuja every two weeks beginning from the 27<sup>th</sup> July, 2018, and that the journey from Warri Delta State to the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, a journey of over 400km, has taken a great toll on the Applicant, as same is embarked upon at great risk to his health, life, business and finances.

He further stated that the Applicant at various times in the month of July, 2018, approached his banks, the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents to withdraw money from his various accounts but the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents declined to allow the Applicant access his accounts on the ground that his account numbers have been blocked or restricted on the authority of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and that no further withdrawals from the accounts would be made by the Applicant. That the Applicant discovered that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent conspired with the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents and invaded and printed the accounts statements of the Applicant without his knowledge and consent, and which the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent attached to his petition to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

He averred that upon inquiry, the Applicant was told by the agents of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent that there was no Court order backing the freezing of his accounts besides the written instructions of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents. That the action of placing restrictions on his accounts has rendered the Applicant impecunious and caused him great embarrassment, abject penury, mental agony, public odium, widespread derision and psychological torture, as the Applicant can no longer fend for his wife, children, dependants and associates who depend on him for their means of



livelihood. That notwithstanding the letters of demand for the defreezing of his account, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has neglected, ignored and/or refused to unblock or unfreeze his account or arraign him in Court, even as their investigations and interrogations that have spanned over a year, which included the subjection of the Applicant to polygraph test, have not yielded anything incriminating against the Applicant.

He averred that the Applicant had worked with Pinnacle Oil & Gas Ltd as Chief Security Officer, and never in the accounts department, for three years before this allegation, and that within this period, there has not been any report or allegation of missing products by the CEO, Mr. Peter Mbah or any other staff of the Company.

In his written address in support of the application, learned counsel for the Applicant, Blessing Eyee, Esq., raised a sole issue for determination, namely;

***“Whether the Applicant’s fundamental rights has been breached, or are likely to be breached, by the conduct of the Respondents, such as will entitle the Applicant to the grant of the reliefs sought from this honourable Court?”***

Proffering arguments on the issue so raised learned counsel relied on Section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) to posit that the Applicant is entitled to the grant of the reliefs sought from this Court, following the breach or likely breach of his fundamental rights by the despicable and orchestrated conduct of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, acting on an alleged petition said to have been written by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, as well as by the despicable and orchestrated conduct of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Respondents by putting a Post No Debit order on the accounts of the Applicant while

acting upon the instructions of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent without due diligence and without any Court order authorizing same. Here referred to **FRN v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt.113) at 216-217.**

He enumerated the aspects of the breach of the Applicant's fundamental rights by the Respondents as follows:

- i) Failure of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to comply with the provisions of Section 15(1)(2) & (3) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, as they relate to arrest of a suspect without warrant.
- ii) Failure of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to comply with Section 30(1)&(2) of ACJA 2015 by granting bail to the Applicant within 24 hours of his arrest and/or charge him to Court, the Applicant having been arrested without warrant.
- iii) Failure of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to release to the Applicant his properties forcibly seized from him without warrant and without compliance with the provisions for such seizure as provided by Sections 10(1) (2)&(3) and 337(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, despite repeated demands for same.
- iv) The placing of restrictions on the accounts of the Applicant without a valid Order of a Court of competent jurisdiction contrary to Sections 36(5) & 44(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as altered, Sections 1&2, of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 and Sections 6, 7, 34 and 38 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004. He referred to **GTB PLC v. Adedamola (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt 1664) 30 at 43; ESA v. Dangabar (2012) LPELR-19732(CA).**

- v) Continuous and serial invitations to visit the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent when it is obvious that the Petitioner (2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent) who has never shown up, has no case against the Applicant, as same constitutes a violation of the Applicant's fundamental right to personal liberty and freedom of movement as enshrined in Sections 35 & 41(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered.
- vi) Constant and repeated attempts of threats of arrest and detention meted to the Applicant at the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent here in Abuja.

Learned counsel submitted that Order XI of the Fundamental Human Rights Rules, 2009 empowers the Court to make such orders and give such directions as it may consider just or appropriate for the purpose of enforcing the rights of an individual. He posited that in cases of infringement or contravention of fundamental rights of any person whose rights are held to have been violated or infringed upon, the person is entitled to an award of compensatory damages. He referred to Sections 35(5) of the 1999 Constitution, as altered, Sections 323(1) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, and the cases of **Odogu v. A.G. Federation (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.456) 508 at 519; Abiola v. Abacha (1998) 1 HRLRA 447 at 486**, inter alia.

He argued that the Applicant has made out a case of unlawful arrest and detention and the flagrant restriction of his accounts without a valid Order of the Court by the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Respondents at the instance of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, and that the Applicant is thus entitled to compensatory damages.

He urged the Court in conclusion, to grant the prayers of the Applicant as he has made out a case of serial flagrant violations of his fundamental rights by the Respondents.

In opposition to the Application, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent filed a nine paragraphs counter affidavit deposed to by one Mustapha Sulaiman Shaq, a detective officer of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, attached to the AMCON DESK Unit of the Commission.

In the said counter affidavit dated and filed on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of July, 2020, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent averred that the depositions in the Applicant's affidavit do not represent the true facts of the case. That the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent received a petition from Pinnacle Oil & Gas Limited on the 16<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018 on the allegation of theft of product against the Applicant and others, in response to which its officers commenced investigation into the allegations. That from the relevant documents obtained in the course of investigation, a prima facie case of conspiracy and money laundering was suspected against the Applicant and others which called for their response to the allegations, and following the refusal of the Applicant and the others to respond to their several calls, the officers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent trailed the Applicant down to Warri, using the address provided.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent averred that on the 5<sup>th</sup> of July, 2018, its officers arrested the Applicant in Warri, Delta State and moved him to their Benin Zonal Office for questioning. That on the said 5<sup>th</sup> day of July 2018, the Applicant made a statement to the officers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, after which he applied for bail and same was granted to him same day while investigations continued into the case. That at the conclusions of the investigation against other suspects, a 55 count charge bordering on conspiracy and money laundering was filed

against other suspects at the Federal High Court, Warri on the 28<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2019 in Charge No. FHA/WR/44C/2019.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent further averred that the investigation against the Applicant was concluded on 18<sup>th</sup> June, 2019 when the only response which was being awaited from a service provider to the Applicant was received by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and that charges bordering on money laundering have been prepared against the Applicant, ready to be filed any moment from now.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent stated that the phones of the Applicant were not taken from him until the time of making his statement at its Zonal Office in Benin and that he was not prevented from making any call at the point of arrest. That the Applicant was not humiliated and/or detained anywhere by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent for three days and that there was no search conducted at his residence.

It was further averred by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent that the Applicant was informed of the allegation against him before he was arrested at Warri, Delta State on the 5<sup>th</sup> July, 2019(sic), and that the allegations against him bothers on theft of Petroleum Products and not any cash. That the allegations against the Applicant were investigated and a prima facie case of conspiracy and money laundering was found against others, hence the charge at the Federal High Court, Warri, Delta (Exh.EFCC2). That investigation against the Applicant having been concluded, there will be no need inviting him for further interview. Furthermore, that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is not holding unto any valuable item belonging to the Applicant except his phone that was forensically analysed and evidence vital to the prosecution of the Applicant were found for which the phone is

to be tendered by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent at the trial of the Applicant.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent averred that the facts deposed to by the Applicant in paragraphs 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 60 of his supporting affidavit regarding the restriction of his accounts, are facts within the exclusive knowledge of the Applicant; that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is not in a position to counter them. That the letters written by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent (placing Post No debit Order on Applicant's accounts) have a life span and that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent must not go beyond the letter if no need arise.

Finally, that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has no restriction on the accounts of the Applicant after the expiration of 72 hours after the letters were served on the Applicant's bankers.

Learned counsel for the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, Francis A. Jirbo, Esq, raised two issues for determination in his written submission in support of the counter affidavit, namely;

- a) Whether the Applicant has made out a case of any breach or likely breach of his fundamental rights by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent?
- b) Whether the Applicant is entitled to any monetary damages and a public apology by/from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in this case?

Arguing the two issues jointly, learned 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's counsel contended that an applicant whose arrest is lawful and legal as in this case does not have a justiciable right upon which he can approach the Court in line with Section 46 of the Constitution. He argued that the Applicant was not detained for even one day as there is no evidence of such detention.

That being mindful of the constitutional provisions relating to liberty of an individual, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent within 24 hours of the arrest of the Applicant, offered him administrative bail, and therefore, no right of the Applicant was ever breached by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

Learned counsel further posited that Section 35(1)(c) of the same constitution legitimized the arrest and detention of any one reasonably suspected to have committed a criminal offence as in the case of the Applicant whose invitation and/or arrest was pursuant to a reasonable suspicion of his having committed the offence of money laundering. He contended that the reasonableness of the suspicion on the part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has been put to rest with the filing of charges against the co-suspects with the Applicant in Charge No. FHC/WR/44C/2019 pending before the Federal High Court, Warri, Delta State while the charges against the Applicant will be filed shortly as investigations against him has just been concluded.

Relying on **A.G. Anambra State v. Chief Chris Uba(2005) 33 WRN 191**, he submitted that the Applicant does not have a right to be shielded from investigation and prosecution. He further referred to **Nzewi&Ors v. Commissioner of Police (2002) 2 HRLR 156**.

He urged the Court on the strength of the above authorities to refuse the claim for injunctive reliefs sought against the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in this case; arguing that the grant of same would amount to the Court lending itself as a shield against the investigation of the Applicant for an alleged crime.

On the suspension of the Applicant's accounts, learned counsel posited that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is empowered by Section 6 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011 as amended in

2012, to issue letters to banks for suspension of accounts in the course of investigation for a duration of 72 hours, after which the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent may apply to the Court for exparte order if it desires to extend the suspension. He argued that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, in this case, did not make any application to Court for any order on the bank accounts of the Applicant and that as such the Applicant's accounts opened at the expiration of the 72 hours.

He urged the Court to follow the above judicial authorities and the legislation cited by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and dismiss the application of the Applicant for lacking in merit and/or being commenced mala fide, with a cost of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira).

In response to 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit, the Applicant filed a 40 paragraphs Further Affidavit deposed to by Usman Salihu and filed on 7<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2020. He averred that what was shown to the Applicant by the agents of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent at their AMCON Desk in Abuja was a petition from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent alleging theft of a cash sum of N135,000,000.00 against the Applicant and others, and not theft of product.

He maintained that the Applicant was arrested on the 2<sup>nd</sup> day of July, 2018 and not 5<sup>th</sup> July, 2018, and that he did not leave the custody of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent until the evening of 6<sup>th</sup> July, 2018.

Contrary to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's averment that the Applicant's accounts remained opened after 72 hours of the placing of suspension on same, the Deponent averred that the Applicant approached the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to make withdrawals from his account domiciled with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> July, 2018 and the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of December, 2019 (sic) and in



each occasion, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent declined to allow him access, but rather, referred him to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to address the issue.

He averred that after waiting in vain for several months, the Applicant caused a letter to be written to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, dated 21<sup>st</sup> February, 2019 through Mike Ozekhome's chambers, demanding the lifting of "Post No Debit" placed on his account among others.

That the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent refused or neglected to act on the letter and thus the Applicant approached the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's agent named Usman Imam, who because of the Applicant's deteriorating health, instructed the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to allow the Applicant to continually withdraw to the extent of the Applicant's monthly pension which is less than Thirty Thousand Naira (N30,000.00), notwithstanding the fact that the Applicant has sufficient funds in his account. That on 23<sup>rd</sup> December, 2019, the Applicant went to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to withdraw the sum of N200,000.00 from the said account and he was refused access to his money, with "PND" written on his withdrawal slip. Also on 14<sup>th</sup> January, 2020, the Applicant had the same experience when he went to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent to withdraw money from his account and he was refused access to his money, with the inscription "DORMANT/FROZEN" written on his withdrawal slip. That uptill this moment, the Applicant cannot access any of his accounts domiciled with the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Respondents on the ground that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has not directed them to so do.

He averred that the Applicant is not aware of any charge against him as alleged by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent as he was arrested and investigated along with others after which other suspects were charged to Court, without him.

The learned Applicant's counsel raised two further issues for determination in his written submission in support of the Further Affidavit, namely;

- a) Whether the Applicant has made out a case of any breach or likely breach of his fundamental rights by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent?
- b) Whether the Applicant is entitled to any monetary damages and a public apology by/from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in this case?

Arguing issue one, he contended that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's mere denial of paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 31, 36, 40, 41, 43, 59 and 60 of the Applicant's affidavit in support of the motion on notice, without more, will not be sufficient to exonerate them from the fundamental breaches against the Applicant, such as the Applicant's arrest without warrant, keeping the Applicant in custody for 5 days without taking his statement, all the intimidations and harassments by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's armed personnel which the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent admitted in their paragraph 7(1) of their counter affidavit, and finally, the acts of placing the Applicant's accounts on "Post No Debit" by the letter written by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents without any ex parte order from a Court of competent jurisdiction backing such directive.

He posited that the said paragraphs of the Applicant's affidavit in support of the motion on notice are explicit and point to the facts that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent breached the fundamental rights of the Applicant as provided by Section 44 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, by seizing and not allowing the Applicant access to his property and thereby

caused the Applicant what he suffered as contained in paragraph 39 of his affidavit.

Learned counsel contended that even in the face of the said letter as acknowledged by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in paragraphs 7(u) and (v) of their counter affidavit, and by the provisions of Sections 34 and 38 (1&2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has no power to freeze, attach or place a “Post No Debit” on the accounts of the Applicant howsoever without first applying for and obtaining an order of a Court of competent jurisdiction to that effect.

He drew the Court’s attention to the Applicant’s solicitor’s letter to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent (Exhibit B), dated 20<sup>th</sup> February, 2019 which demanded for the unfreezing and/or unblocking of the accounts of the Applicant and other suspects, and argued that the restrictions on the Applicant’s accounts with the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents had been in force before and after the conclusion of the investigation by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

He referred to **Atiku v. Oyekunle (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt.1620)** on the point that documentary evidence lends more credence to material facts deposed to in an affidavit.

He referred to **GTB PLC v. Adedamola (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt.1664) 30 at 43** on the point that before freezing customer’s account, the bank must be satisfied that there is an order.

On the reliance of 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent on Section 35(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), learned Applicant’s counsel posited that they do not contest the provisions of the said section of the Constitution and contended that what is in issue here is the way and manner the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent carried out the arrest and whether it complies with the provisions of the relevant laws.

He argued to the effect that the actions of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent being complained of by the Applicant are in breach of Sections 34, 35, 37, 43 and 44 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent on his part, filed a 15 paragraphs counter affidavit deposed to by one AmanyiOcholaOchoyo, a Solicitor in the law firm of counsel to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent. He averred that a theft of Petroleum products worth the sum of N135,000,000.00 at the tank farm of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent led the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent to write a petition to the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in April, 2018 against the Applicant and others over the theft. That to the best knowledge of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, the Applicant and others were invited in respect of the petition sent to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent is not privy to the internal processes of investigations/fact finding at the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's office.

He stated that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent's complaint to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is that petroleum products worth over N135m were stolen under the watch of the Applicant and five others which needed to be investigated. That as a law abiding citizen the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent decided not to take laws into his hands but had an obligation to report thefts and criminal activities in his company to the law enforcement agencies, and that his petition caused no harm or injury to the Applicant in any way.

In his written address in support of the counter affidavit, learned counsel for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, OgiwoduOkibe-Oga (Mrs) submitted a lone issue for determination, namely;

***“Whether from the facts and circumstance of this case, the mere complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent amounts to breach of the Applicant's fundamental rights?”***

Proffering arguments on the issue so raised, learned counsel posited that the law is trite that any person can lay genuine complaint to the law enforcement agents for the purpose of investigation which not only aids the duties of such law enforcement agency but also helps in prevention of crime in the society. He referred to Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004 which empowers the Commission to receive information from any person, authority, or company.

He contended that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent acted within the ambit of the law by lodging a complaint to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

He referred to **Diamond Bank PLC v. Opara (2018) 7 NWLR (1617) P.97** on when complaint to law enforcement agencies amounts to abuse of process of law, and argued that in the instant case, the petition of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent on behalf of his company and the consequential investigations of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent will reveal that there was neither malice nor bias in the petition of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent.

He urged the Court to hold that the complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was made in good faith which was upon a reasonable ground and does not amount to breach of the fundamental rights of the Applicant.

Responding to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit, the Applicant filed a 12 paragraphs Further Affidavit where he reaffirmed the averments in his affidavit in support of the Motion on Notice and further averred that the Applicant admits paragraph 8 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit to the extent that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent made a complaint to the office of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent where he falsely accused the Applicant of theft of his company's petroleum products. He stated that since the completion of investigation into the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent's

allegation by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, only the Applicant was not charged or arraigned in any Court by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent out of the six members of staff affected by the said allegation. That it was still on the prompting of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent that the accounts of the Applicant are still on Post No Debit status by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in spite of the fact that investigation has since been concluded and the Applicant not charged or arraigned in any Court based on the alleged theft.

In his reply on points of law to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent's written address, learned Applicant's counsel raised for determination, the issue of: ***"Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the mere complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent amounts to breach of the Applicant's fundamental rights?"***

He submitted that the case of Diamond Bank PLC v. Opara (supra) is apt in this circumstances, to show that the complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent amounts to a breach of Applicant's fundamental rights in that the false information of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent was borne out of malice and bad faith, and that same made the Applicant to pass through pains, agony and hardships in the hands of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

He urged the Court to hold that the instigation and prompting of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent in "staging" the arrest of the Applicant without warrant by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent as well as the encouragement and support of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent to the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents through the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to tenaciously hold on the accounts of the Applicant without Court Order even as investigation into the matter has been completed and nothing incriminating found against the Applicant, are acts of malice, bias and a desire to misuse or prevent the system of administration of justice.

Also in opposition to the application, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent filed an 18 paragraphs counter affidavit deposed to by its compliance officer, one Farukldiaro. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent averred that it received a letter from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent requesting for the account of the Applicant to be placed on a “No Debit Status”. That the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent omitted to attach the usual order of Court which therefore, made it impractical for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to carry out the directive and that the funds of the Applicant have always been accessible to the Applicant beginning from when the letter from Economic and Financial Crimes Commission was received by the Bank.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent further averred that as a matter of fact, the Applicant still makes withdrawals from his account till even after the filing of the Originating Process in this suit. The Applicant’s Statement of Account was attached to the affidavit as Exhibit A.

The learned 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent’s counsel, Katchy Felix, Esq, in his written address in support of the counter affidavit, raised two issues for determination, to wit;

- i) Whether the Applicant’s case is competent ab initio in view of the non-compliance with Order 2 Rule 4 of the Fundamental Rights, Enforcement Rules, 2009?
- ii) i) Whether the Applicant has established their (sic) claims against the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to entitle him to the reliefs sought?

Arguing issue one, learned counsel relied on **Onifade v. Olayiwola&Ors (1990) LPELR-2680 (SC)** to submit that when a statute or rules has laid down a procedure for doing a particular act, the doing of that act in any other particular way other than the way prescribed by law will amount to a nullity.

He further relied on **MIC Royal Ltd v. APCON (2018) LPELR-45314(CA)** to contend that the Applicant's affidavit in support of the originating motion is incompetent having been deposed other than by person so authorised by virtue of the provision of Order II Rule 4 of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009. He urged the Court to strike out the said affidavit for being in deliberate violation of Order II Rule 4 of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure, Rules.

He argued that in the absence of a competent affidavit, this Court is bereft of the relevant material to adjudicate on this matter. He urged the Court to dismiss the action of the Applicant with cost awarded in favour of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent.

On issue two, learned counsel placed reliance on **Onah v. Okenwa (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt.1194) 535-536** to submit that the burden of proof lies on an applicant who applied for the enforcement of his fundamental rights to establish by credible affidavit evidence that his fundamental rights was breached. He contended that the Applicant herein has failed to establish his claims as to be entitled to his reliefs sought.

Replying to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit, the Applicant filed a 15 paragraphs further affidavit and reply on points of law.

The Applicant in the further affidavit reiterated the averments in his affidavit in support of the motion on notice and stated that even as at 23<sup>rd</sup> day of December, 2019, the Applicant attempted again to withdraw some funds from his account domiciled with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent, an amount higher than the usual monthly withdrawal, but the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent did not honour the withdrawal instruction but rather stamped and wrote on the withdrawal slip the inscription "PND".



In his reply on points of law, learned Applicant's counsel raised the following two issues for determination;

1. Whether the Applicant's case is competent ab initio in view of the non-compliance with Order 2 Rule 4 of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009?
2. Whether the Applicant has established his claims against the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to entitle him to the reliefs sought?

On issue one, he posited that the Applicant's application contains all the procedures as laid down in Order II Rules 3 and 4 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. He referred to paragraphs 1,2,3,10,11,16,19 and 23 of the Applicant's affidavit in support of the Motion on Notice.

He further argued that assuming but without conceding that the Applicant did not comply with all the laid down rules, that the breach of a rule of practice and procedure does not render the proceedings a nullity but merely an irregularity. He referred to **Saudev. Abdullahi (1989) NWLR (Pt.166) 388.**

He submitted that the Applicant's affidavit in support of the originating motion is competent having been deposed to by a person so authorised by virtue of the provision of Order II Rule 4 of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure, Rules, 2009.

On issue 2, learned counsel contended that the mere denial of paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, 36, 38 and 39 of the Applicant's affidavit in support of the Motion on Notice, without more, will not suffice to exonerate the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent from its involvement and collaboration with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to put the account of the Applicant on PND. He argued that the Applicant had attached Exhibit 'A1' suggesting that his account has been

restricted, in further proof that his account domiciled with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent had been on “PND” contrary to the depositions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent in paragraphs 17 and 18 of their counter affidavit. He relied on **Akiti v. Oyekunle (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt.1620) 191** to posit that documentary evidence lends more credence to material facts deposed to in an affidavit. He submitted that the Applicant has established by credible affidavit evidence that his fundamental right was breached.

Still in opposition to the application, the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent filed a 10 paragraphs counter affidavit deposed to by one Farida Umar Usman, a legal practitioner in the law firm of counsel to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent.

Admitting paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 32, 33, and 35 of the Applicant’s affidavit in support of the application, the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent averred that the depositions contained in the said paragraphs are true only to the extent that it received a letter with reference: CR/3000/EFCC/ABJ/AMCON/VOL.1/944 dated 9<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2019 from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent informing it that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was investigating a case in which the Applicant’s account featured, and requested the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent to furnish it with the account opening package; statements of account and certificate of identification relating to the Applicant’s account.

The 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent stated that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent by the said letter also directed it to place a Post No Debit (“PND”) on the Applicant’s account pursuant to its powers contained in Section 38(1) & (2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 and Section 21 of Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, as amended. That the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent in compliance with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent’s directive, forwarded all the requisite documents to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and placed a Post

No Debit on the account of the Applicant on the 12<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018.

The 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent stated that it acted lawfully in complying with the directives issued by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to produce relevant documents and place a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant without knowledge of any defect in the procedure leading to the exercise of the powers by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, and that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent and its officers who acted believed fervently that they were carrying out a lawful and usual directive, and giving due cooperation to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in carrying out its lawful duties of investigation of an alleged crime.

The said letter from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was exhibited as “Exhibit FBN1”.

In his written address in support of the counter affidavit, learned 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent’s counsel, Mas’udMobolajiAlabeleweEsq., submitted a lone issue for determination, namely;

***“Whether from the facts deposed to in the affidavit, in support of the application, the fourth Respondent could be held liable for complying with the directives of the first Respondent in placing a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant.”***

Arguing the issue so raised, learned counsel posited that the Banker/Customer relationship existing between the Applicant and the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent is purely contractual and not in any way connected with any criminal allegation which is the purview of the investigations by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and for which the Applicant was arrested, detained and interrogated. He contended that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is empowered by law to issue directives to any financial institution including the

4<sup>th</sup> Respondent, and that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent is legally obliged to fully cooperate with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent or risk penal sanctions. He referred to Sections 38(1) & (2), and 34(1)(2)&(4) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act and Section 21 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act.

Learned counsel posited that the purport of the above laws is that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent will by a motion ex parte obtain an order from a Court of competent jurisdiction, and thereafter forward a directive as contained in Form B of the schedule to the EFCC Act, signed by the Chairman of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent or any of its authorised officers directing the bank to restrict an account domiciled with it.

He argued that the law did not contemplate that the Ex-parte Order be served on the bank or financial institution before it complies with the directives contained in Form B. That the only order which ultimately gets served on the financial institution is the directive in Form B.

He contended that in the face of Section 38(2)(b) of the EFCC Act, which provides penal sanctions for a person who fails to comply with any lawful enquiry or requirements made by any authorised officer in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that it is inconceivable that any officer of a financial institution who receives a directive in Form B is vested with any discretion to comply with the directive, and neither is such officer given an opportunity or latitude to investigate or enquire into the due compliance or otherwise of the procedure leading to the issuance of the directive.

Learned counsel urged the Court to decline the invitation to apply the authorities of **Guaranty Trust Bank PLC v. Adedamola (supra)** requiring a bank to satisfy itself that there

was an order issued by a Court before placing any form of restriction on a customer's account. He argued that the directive issued by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent in this case was not hinged on Section 34 of the EFCC Act which was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in the **Guaranty Trust Bank PLC v. Adedamola** case, but on Section 38(1) of the EFCC Act and Section 21 of the Money Laundering Act.

He thus contended that the facts and the decisions in the above case and previous decisions on this issue, are therefore clearly distinguishable from the facts and peculiar circumstances of this case.

He submitted that where, as in this case, a function is discharged, being an official duty, there is always a presumption recognised by law that it was done legitimately, correctly and solemnly until the contrary is established. He referred to Section 168(1&2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, and the case of **Hon. Dr. Tukurldris Nadabo v. Sani Abdullahi Dabai & 4 Ors (2011) 7 NWLR (Pt.1245) 155 at 178.**

He urged the Court in conclusion, to hold that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent was justified to place restriction on the Applicant's accounts pursuant to a directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in view of Section 5(a) of the Money Laundering Act, and to resist the invitation to find the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent jointly liable to the Applicant for carrying out a seemingly lawful directive.

Replying to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit, the Applicant filed an 11 paragraphs further affidavit and Reply on points of law. The Applicant averred that the restriction of his account by the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent from the 19<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018 till date caused him and his entire family an untold hardship and great pains. That on the 14<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2020, the Applicant again went to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent to withdraw from his account

where he has sufficient funds and he was told by the staff of the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent that his account has become dormant.

He maintained that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent is privy to the whole illegal acts of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in acting without any Court order, and that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent carried out the instructions without first ensuring that the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has the backing of a Court order as required by law.

Learned Applicant's counsel further raised a sole issue for determination in his reply on points of law to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent's written address in support of its counter affidavit, namely;

***“Whether from the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the application, the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent could be held liable for complying with the directives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in placing a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant?”.***

He argued that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent is jointly liable to the Applicant for failure to exercise due diligence in ensuring that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's instructions and directive had an order of a competent Court backing it in line with Section 34(1)(2)(3) and (4) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act. He posited that it is only an Ex-parte order as provided in the said Section 34 of the Act that can make the acts of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Respondents to be lawful. That anything short of that will be acting in illegality.

Learned counsel submitted that the case of **Chief (Dr.) O. Fajemirokun v. Commercial Bank (credit huonnais) Nig. Ltd & Anor (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt.1135) 558 at 600**, cited by the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent is clearly inapplicable or at best, distinguishable from the facts of this case. That the said case relates to duty of

citizens in reporting cases of commission of crimes to the Police simpliciter and does not in any way support an institution such as the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent who infringed on the rights of a citizen while trying to carry out the instruction of another without ensuring that the law backs their act.

Arguing that the issue here is not all about criminal allegation, he submitted that the fundamental rights of the Applicant as guaranteed by Section 43 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has been breached by the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent in acting without due diligence, thereby causing hardship and pains to the Applicant and his family.

He contended to the effect that the exercise of the power to give directive by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to financial institutions to place a Post No Debit order on a customer's account, must be done in accordance with the provision of the law in Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Act which requires that the order of Court must first be sought and obtained ex parte.

He urged the Court to hold that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent actually received instructions from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to place restrictions on the account of the Applicant and that the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent actually placed a Post No Debit (PND) on the Applicant's account without due diligence of ensuring that the directive was backed by law.

On the part of the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent, it filed an 11 paragraphs counter affidavit deposed to by one Onyete Efenji Olelewe, in opposition to the Applicant's application.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent averred that the Applicant is its customer who maintains an account numbered as 6551989343. That it received a letter from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent dated 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2018

with Reference No. CR:3000/EFCC/ABJ/AMCON/VOL.11941, informing it that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was investigating a case in which the said Applicant's account No. 6551989343 featured prominently.

That the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent requested it to furnish it with the Applicant's account opening package including mandate card, statement of account from January, 2017 to date, as well as to place a Post No Debit ("PND") on the Applicant's account with the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent, pursuant to Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 and Section 21 of the Money Laundering Act, 2011.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent further averred that it knows as a fact that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is empowered by law to investigate individuals and Corporate Accounts in financial institutions suspected to have carried out suspicious transactions or money laundering. Thus in compliance with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's directive in the said letter, the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent forwarded all the requested documents to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent and placed a Post No Debit on the Applicant's account on the 9<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018. That it complied with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's directive and request as contained in the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent letter of 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2018 to enable the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent carry out its lawful activities as empowered by law.

Furthermore, the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent averred that it is entitled to presume that the directive contained in exhibit A (Letter from 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent) issued to her by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was properly and lawfully issued and in compliance with all requirements of law enabling the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to issue the directive.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent however, averred that when it did not get any further response or directive from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, it removed the Post No Debit status placed on the Applicant's



account and that the Applicant has been operating the account as his account is neither blocked nor restricted.

In his written address in support of the counter affidavit, learned counsel for the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent, Olelewe Felix Ibe, Esq, raised a lone issue for determination, namely;

***“Whether the fifth Respondent could be held liable of breach of Applicant’s fundamental human rights as contained in the Applicant’s Motion and deposition in the Affidavit, when the fifth Respondent complied with the directives of the first Respondent in placing a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant with the fifth Respondent?”.***

Arguing the issue so raised, learned counsel contended that the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent’s action in this matter was only complying with the lawful directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in placing a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant with the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent to enable the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent effectively investigate the complaint against the Applicant.

He argued that the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent never at any time arrested or detained the Applicant and as such, is not liable either jointly or otherwise for the alleged hardship suffered by the Applicant from the actions of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent. He posited that the action of the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent in this matter, by the authorities of **Sea Trucks Nigeria Ltd v. Anigboro (2001)10 WRN 78, Tukurv. Government of Taraba State (supra)**, is merely ancillary or incidental in the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent’s investigation of the Applicant based on the complaint of conspiracy, stealing and criminal breach of trust alleged against the Applicant by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent.

He urged the Court to hold that it is improper to constitute the action of the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent in this matter as one for the enforcement of fundamental right of the Applicant. He further urged the Court to hold that the Applicant's action as it relates to the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent is baseless, frivolous and lacks merit.

Learned counsel further contended that by the depositions of the Applicant in his affidavit in support of the application, the Applicant clearly admitted that he was arrested and detained by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent on the complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent. That the Applicant further admitted that it was the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent that directed the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent to place a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant with the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent.

He argued that by the above admissions, the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent did not in any way breach the fundamental right of the Applicant as alleged by the Applicant in this matter.

Arguing further, learned counsel contended that a close look at the depositions of the Applicant will show that the averments did not contain facts to substantiate the Applicant's depositions and claims as contained in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 of the Applicant's affidavit as it relates to the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent. Furthermore, that the said depositions in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 of the Applicant's affidavit contradict Applicant's depositions in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 40-61 of the said affidavit as they relate to the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent.

He referred to **Oludamilola v. State (2008) 26 WRN 57 at 65;** **Nasamu v. State (1979)6-9 SC pg 153** and urged the Court to hold that the contradictions in the Applicant's depositions are fundamental and material conflicts and that the averments

cannot substantiate the claim of the Applicant in this matter as against the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent.

Learned counsel in his further arguments, submitted that the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent having been hinged on Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act and Section 21 of the Money Laundering Act, and not on Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent was justified to have complied with the directive without first satisfying itself that there was an order issued by a Court in that regard as held by the Court of Appeal in **Guaranty Trust Bank PLC v. Adedamola (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt.1664) 30 at 43.**

He urged the Court to hold that the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent was justified to place a Post No Debit on the Applicant's accounts pursuant to a directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in view of Section 5(a) of the Money Laundering Act and to resist the invitation to find the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent jointly liable to the Applicant for carrying out a seemingly lawful directive.

The Applicant in response to the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit, filed an 11 paragraphs Further Affidavit and Reply on Points of Law. The Applicant averred that the depositions in paragraph 8(i-iii) of the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit are false, misleading, erroneous, contradictory, approbating and reprobating, and that the Applicant's account domiciled with the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent has been placed on "Post No Debit" status until about 15<sup>th</sup> December, 2019 when it was lifted. He averred that the restriction placed the Applicant's account by the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent from the 19<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018 till December, 2019, caused an untold hardship and great pains to the Applicant and his entire family.

He maintained that the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent is privy to the whole illegal acts of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in acting without any Court order.

In his reply on points of law, learned Applicant's counsel raised for determination, the issue of:

***“Whether from the facts deposed to in the affidavit in support of the application, the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent could be held liable for breach of the Applicant's fundamental rights, by complying with the directives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in placing a Post No Debit on the account of the Applicant?”***

He argued that the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent is jointly liable to the Applicant because the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent ought to have exercised due diligence in ensuring that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's instructions and directive had an order of a competent Court backing it in line with Section 35(1),(2),(3) and (5) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act.

Countering the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent's contention that it was carrying out “a seemingly lawful” and usual directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, the learned Applicant's counsel posited that it is only an exparte order as provided in Section 35 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act that can make the acts of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents lawful. That anything short of that will be acting in illegality.

He submitted in conclusion that the Applicant has been able to establish by credible affidavit evidence that his fundamental rights were breached by the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent when it complied with the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent which led to the restrictions placed on the Applicant's account without satisfying itself of any existing ex parte order authorising such directive.

The question for consideration is, **whether the applicant has proved the infraction or the likelihood of infraction of his fundamental rights as enshrined in 1999 Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria against the Respondent?**

The constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) in its chapter IV guarantees to every citizen of the country, some basic fundamental human rights, some of which are right to personal liberty, (S.35), and right against compulsory acquisition of property (S.44).

Where there is any infraction or likelihood of breach of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 46(1) of the Constitution empowers a citizen who alleges that his right has been, is being or likely to be contravened, to apply to the High Court for redress.

In the exercise of this constitutional right, the Applicant herein has approached this Court alleging in essence that his rights to personal liberty and right to own property have been breached by the Respondents and is therefore seeking for redress against the Respondents.

The Courts in a plethora of cases, have laid down the procedure to be adopted by the trial Court in an application such as the instant case. Thus in **Sea Trucks (Nigeria) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) LPELR-3025 (SC)**, the Apex Court, held, per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C, that:

***“The correct approach in a claim for the enforcement of fundamental rights is to examine the relief sought, the grounds for such relief, and the facts relied upon. Where the facts relied upon disclose a breach of the fundamental right of the applicant as the basis of the claim, here there is a redress through the enforcement***

***of such rights through the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979.”***

Briefly summarised, the Applicant herein is praying the Court for a declaration that his rights to personal liberty and to own property were breached by the Respondents and for an order enforcing his fundamental rights against the Respondents. The Applicant alleged that he was unlawfully arrested without warrant by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent at the instigation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, and detained without arraignment nor trial in Court for five (5) days. Also, that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, without due process of law, gave directives to the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents to place restriction on his bank accounts, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, without satisfying themselves that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent’s directive was backed by an order of Court as required by law, proceeded to comply with the said directive thereby breaching his fundamental right by denying him access to his funds and causing him pains and hardship in so doing.

The law is trite that the burden of proving the legality and constitutionality of an arrest and detention is on the party who effected the arrest. See **Madiebo&Ors v. Nwankwo (2001) LPELR-6965 (CA).**

However, that burden will only arise where a prima facie evidence of unlawful arrest and detention has been adduced by the person alleging unlawful arrest and detention. Thus, in **SPDC &Anor v. Pessu (2014) LPELR-23325 (CA)**, the Court of Appeal, per Ogakwu, J.C.A. held that:

***“Though trite law as held by the lower Court on pages 74-75 of the Records that the burden of proving that an arrest and detention is legal is on the party who effected the arrest, it seems to me that this a (sic) burden that will only arise where the person alleging***

***unlawful arrest and detention has adduced prima facie evidence of an unlawful arrest and detention. In Gusau v. Uwazurike (2012) 28 WRN III at 140-141, this Court held that a detention can only be adjudged wrongful or unlawful in the first place if there is no legal foundation to base the arrest and/or detention.”***

In the instant case, the grounds on which the Applicant is alleging that his arrest and alleged detention by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is unlawful, is that he was arrested without warrant, and that having thus arrested him without warrant, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent detained him for a total period of five (5) days before he was released on administrative bail.

Regarding the arrest without warrant, it is not the law that the absence of warrant of arrest ipso facto makes an arrest wrongful or unlawful. The import of Section 35(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) is that a person's right to personal liberty may be deprived (by way of arrest without warrant) where the person is reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is empowered by Sections 6(b) and 7(1)(a) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, etc) Act, 2004, to conduct investigations as to whether any person or organisation has committed an offence relating to economic and financial crimes. The performance of this function of investigation may entail the bringing into custody, the person being investigated, either for the purposes of taking his statement or to ensure a proper and uninhibited conduct of the investigation.

The 1<sup>st</sup> respondent admitted that the Applicant was arrested, stating that the arrest was premised on a petition written to

them by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent alleging theft of Petroleum Products worth over N135,000,000.00 against the Applicant and five others, and that the arrest was consequent upon the failure of the Applicant to respond to their invitation to come forward and answer to the allegation.

It is instructive that the enabling law of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), did not provide that every arrest by the Commission, must be by virtue of a warrant to that effect. And since the Constitution envisages that a person may be arrested without warrant of arrest upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, an arrest cannot be unlawful where no law has been breached thereby. What the law requires in the absence of warrant of arrest is for the law enforcement agency, in this case the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), to exercise their power of arrest and detention in good faith. Thus in **First Bank of Nigeria PLC &Ors v. A.G. Federation &Ors (2013) LPELR-20152(CA)**, the Court of Appeal, per Akomolafe-Wilson, JCA, held:

***“It is indisputable that the EFCC Act, like the EFCC, the Police has the right to investigate, arrest and detain any person who is suspected of the Commission of any offence under the EFCC Act. Any proved detention however must be justified in law, and must be exercised in good faith in the light of the important right of each individual.”***

The learned Justice further held at page 59, paras C-F, that:

***“It is an established principle of law that where there is evidence of arrest and detention of an applicant which were done or investigated by the respondent in an action for the enforcement of fundamental rights, it***



***is for the respondent to show that the arrest and detention were lawful. In other words, the onus is on the person who admits detention of another to prove that the detention is lawful.”***

What is evident from the above decision of the Appellate Court is that it is not sufficient for an applicant to merely allege that he was detained by the respondent. The applicant must prove the fact of his detention, except where same is admitted by the respondent before the onus of proving the legality of the detention shifts to the respondent.

In the instant case, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in paragraph 6 of its counter affidavit denied the facts as to the detention of the Applicant for five days, and averred in paragraph 7(d)&(e) of the said counter affidavit that on the same day it arrested the Applicant, it moved the Applicant from Warri to its Benin Zonal Office where the Applicant made a statement and applied for bail which was granted him the same day.

It is therefore incumbent on the Applicant to show by material evidence that he was indeed detained by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent for the number of days which he alleged in his affidavit. This, the Applicant failed to do and without the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent admitting the detention of the Applicant for the number of days which he alleges, there is nothing before this Court on the basis of which this Court can hold that the right to personal liberty of the Applicant was breached by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent. The ipsit dixit of the Applicant, without more, does not suffice in the circumstances of the instant case.

Regarding the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent in this case, who was sued by the Applicant on the basis that his petition to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent led to the alleged breach of his fundamental rights;

the law was succinctly stated by the Court of Appeal, per Ogakwu, J.C.A in **SPDC &Anor v. Pessu (supra)**, that:

***“There is no doubt that someone who merely gives information without more, which information led to the arrest of a suspect by the police, acting within their mandate and responsibility, cannot be liable in an action for unlawful arrest and detention.”***

See also **Nwangwu&Anor v. John Duru&Anor (2001) LPELR-2001(CA)**.

From the facts of this case, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent merely wrote a petition, to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, and probably facilitated the arrest of the Applicant and other suspects by giving information to the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent. The evidence before this Court shows that the petition of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent was not frivolous as five out of the six suspects against whom the petition was written, have been charged before a Court at the conclusion of investigation by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

It is my considered view, and I so hold, that the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent is not liable for the acts of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent done in the exercise of its investigative duties.

The Applicant also alleged to the effect that he suffered inhuman and degrading treatment from the 1<sup>st</sup> respondent. This, in my view, was not substantiated, and therefore, not proved by the Applicant. Beyond the mere allegation of humiliation and forcible dragging “like common criminal”, which were denied by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, the Applicant did not offer any material evidence in proof of the facts alleged.

Another aspect of the breach of his rights alleged by the Applicant is the placing of Post No Debit order on his bank accounts with the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent

without the order of Court as required by law. The Applicant relied on section 34 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, etc) Act, and the case of **GTB PLC v. Adedamola (supra)** to contend that the failure of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to obtain an order of Court before placing a restriction on his account, constitutes a breach of his fundamental rights as the action of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent deprived of him of the use of his funds to cater for his personal needs and those of his family and dependants.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent admitted directing the placement of restriction on the accounts of the Applicant but alleged that the suspension of the Applicant's accounts was only for the duration of 72 hours pursuant to Section 6 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, as amended in 2012. This assertion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is however, clearly unfounded.

Section 6 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act deals with situations where the Commission receives report of suspicious financial transactions from a Financial Institution or Designated Non-Financial Institution. The said Section is inapplicable to the instant case as the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was only investigating a petition alleging theft of petroleum products.

Also, the letter from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent requesting the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents to place Post No Debit (PND) on the accounts of the Applicant (See "Exhibit FBN 1" attached to the 4<sup>th</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit) stated that the request was made pursuant to Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act and Section 21 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, as amended, and not Section 6 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011. The said letter also did not state that the restriction on the

Applicant's accounts was for 72 hours as alleged by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

It is pertinent to note that Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 and Section 21 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, merely give the Commission the power to demand and obtain record. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, did not just give the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent power to demand and obtain records from financial institution, it also prescribed the method or procedure for exercising that power in order to prevent the abuse of same, particularly where the Chairman of the Commission feels the need to place restriction on or freeze the bank account of a person. The Act in this regard, provided that the Chairman of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent or any officer authorised by him, must first apply to the Court ex parte for power to issue such order or directive.

Even where the Commission is proceeding against an account pursuant to the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, still mandates the Commission to first obtain the order of Court before placing restriction on any account.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in this case, did not deny issuing the directive placing restriction on the Applicant's accounts, neither did it deny that it did not obtain the order of Court to issue the said directive. By the authority of the case of **GTB PLC v. Adedamola (supra)** among plethora of other judicial authorities, the action of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent in this regard is unlawful and amounts to the breach of the fundamental right of the Applicant.

What is more? The directive to place Post No Debit on the Applicant's accounts was left ad infinitum by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent as the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent never directed the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents to lift the order on the Applicant's account since July, 2018. This is nothing but a gross violation of the rights of the Applicant. In **Skype Bank PLC v. David & Ors (2014) LPELR-23731 (CA)** Court of Appeal, per Mbaba, JCA, held thus;

***“Though by its very nature, the EFCC Act, particularly Section 34(1) thereof, appears to be dictated by the exigency to fight financial crime, and allows the EFCC to apply by motion ex parte for freezing of account, “if satisfied the money in the account of a person is made through the commission of an offence...,” I do not think that law intended to create a monster out of the EFCC, to just, at the slightest suspicion, whether real or imagined, cause the Court to freeze an account by ex parte order, indefinitely, without bringing the operator of the account to trial and giving him the opportunity to be heard on why the account is frozen.”***

Thus, even where the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent obtains an ex parte order of Court to freeze an account the law does not allow the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to freeze such account indefinitely, let alone where no order of Court was obtained ab initio.

In the circumstances of this case, therefore, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent acted ultra vires its powers in directing the placing of indefinite Post No debit order on the Applicant's accounts without the order of Court, and thereby breached the fundamental right of the Applicant.

The Applicant also alleged that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent seized his telephone upon his arrest and has refused to release same to

the Applicant till date. The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent admitted to holding on to the Applicant's telephone, saying that same is needed for purposes of tendering it in evidence when prosecuting the Applicant.

There is however, nothing to show that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has any intention or plans to prosecute the Applicant for any offence.

The Applicant was arrested as per paragraph 7(d) of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit, on the 5<sup>th</sup> of July, 2018. At the conclusion of investigation into the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent's petition, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent filed a 55 counts charge against the other five suspects, excluding the Applicant, on the 28<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2019, as per Exhibit EFCC2.

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of June, 2019, the Applicant filed this application to enforce his fundamental rights against the Respondents. Following the service of the application on the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent filed a counter affidavit wherein it claimed in paragraph 7(h) thereof that investigation against the Applicant was just concluded sometime on 18<sup>th</sup> June, 2019, and that charges bordering on money laundering have been prepared against the Applicant and ready to be filed any moment.

Curiously however, the purported charges prepared to be filed against the Applicant were not exhibited to prove the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent claim. Instead, it was the charges preferred against suspects who are not parties to this suit that was exhibited by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent as Exhibit EFCC 2.

I do not believe the assertion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent that charges were prepared and ready to be filed against the Applicant, for which reason they are still holding on to the Applicant's telephone. From the 18<sup>th</sup> of June, 2019 when

investigation on the Applicant was purportedly concluded and charges prepared, to the 10<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2021 when this application was moved by the Applicant and the Respondents adopted their respective counter affidavits is (about the space of two (2) years), there was no evidence to show that the purported prepared charges were filed before any Court, neither was there any evidence that the Applicant was arraigned by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent for any offence.

For whatever reason or reasons the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent may have been holding on to the Applicant's telephone since 5<sup>th</sup> July, 2018 till date, it is absolutely not justifiable since the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent has concluded its investigation and did not find any reason to charge the Applicant before any Court of law.

It is my considered view, and I so hold that the act of seizing perpetually as it were, the telephone of the Applicant by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is very unconscionable and smacks of abuse of its powers. It amounts to the violation of the right of the Applicant to own property.

Coming to the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, the contention of the Applicant is that they are jointly liable with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent for the breach of his fundamental rights, for failing to satisfy themselves that the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was backed by a Court order before complying with same by placing a Post No Debit on his accounts in their custody. For this contention, the learned Applicant's counsel relied on the authority of **GTB PLC v. Adedamola & Ors (supra)**.

I have made a finding in this judgment that the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to the 3<sup>rd</sup> -5<sup>th</sup> Respondent banks to place a Post No Debit on the Applicant's accounts in their custody, having not been backed by an order of Court, is illegal and ultra vires the powers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

On the part of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent averred that it received the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent requesting it to place a No debit status on the Applicant's account, but that since the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent omitted to attach the usual order of Court, it made it impractical for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent to carry out the directive. (See paragraph 11(a) & (b) of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent's counter affidavit).

The 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent further averred in paragraph 16 of its counter affidavit that the funds of the Applicant have always been accessible to him, and that the Applicant still makes withdrawals from his account even after the filing of the originating process in this suit. To prove that the account of the Applicant with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent has been accessible to him, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent exhibited the Applicant's statement of account from 1<sup>st</sup> April, 2017 to 18<sup>th</sup> October, 2019 which shows that the Applicant has had access to account up until the last day of the statement of account.

The contention of the Applicant however, is that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent was instructed by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's agent, Usman Imam, who was conversant with the Applicant's deteriorating health condition, to allow the Applicant to continually withdraw an amount to the extent of the Applicant's monthly pension which is less than thirty thousand naira, and that the said permitted monthly withdrawals could not sustain him and his family as well as his medical bills.

The Applicant's statement of account exhibited by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent appears to give credence to Applicant's assertion as it shows that from the 9<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2018 when the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent issued its directive to the 3<sup>rd</sup> -5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, up until 10<sup>th</sup> October, when the statement ended, the monthly withdrawals from the Applicant's account with the



3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent never exceeded the sum of thirty-one thousand naira. When juxtaposed with the previous transactions on the said account before the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's directive, it is evident that debit transactions on the Applicant's account with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent were greatly restricted from the date of the issuance of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's unlawful directive to the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents.

The Applicant further exhibited a withdrawal slip from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent (Exhibit A) to his further affidavit showing that he attempted to withdraw the sum of N200,000.00 from his account on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December, 2019, but same was declined by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent and "PND" inscribed on the slip by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent.

From the foregoing, I believe the evidence of the Applicant that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent did indeed place restriction on his account with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Respondent on the instruction of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

The 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents on the other hand outrightly admitted placing Post No Debit (PND) on the Applicant's accounts in their custody, both of them stating that they believed they were carrying out "seemingly" lawful directive.

On the part of the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent, it stated that after no further response from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, it lifted the Post No Debit status on the account of Applicant. The Applicant in his further affidavit (paragraph 7), confirmed the lifting of the "Post No Debit" order on his account by the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent, stating however, that it was not until the 15<sup>th</sup> of December, 2019 before the order was lifted by the 5<sup>th</sup> Respondent.

The respective learned counsel for both the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents both argued in the written submissions in support

of their counter affidavits that the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's directive was premised on Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 and Section 21 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, and not on pursuant to Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004. They thus argued to the effect that the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents were not obliged to satisfy themselves that there was an order of Court before complying with the directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

The 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, to my mind, were only trying to be clever by half. As stated earlier in this judgment, Section 38(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 and Section 21 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2011, merely empower the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to receive information and records without hindrance from Financial Institutions and Designated Non-Financial Institutions. Section 34(1) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004, however, stipulates the procedure for exercising that powers by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

By Section 34(3) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004:

***“The Manager or any other person in control of the financial institution shall take necessary steps to comply with the requirements of the order made pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.”***

By interpretation, the manager or any other person in control of the financial institution like the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, shall take steps to comply with the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent's directive, only when such directive or order is made pursuant to Subsection (2) of Section 34 of the Act. Subsection (2) of the Section requires

that the order of the Chairman of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent or any other person authorised by him to the financial institution, to be issued under subsection (1) of the section, which in turn made it mandatory for the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent to first apply ex parte to the Court for power to issue such order or directive.

What this means in a nutshell is that a bank or financial institution must first ascertain or satisfy itself that a directive or order from the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is backed by an order of Court before placing any form of restriction on a customer's account. The Court of Appeal stated this much in the case of **GTB PLC v. Adedamola&Ors (supra)**.

Having held that the ***“Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has no power to give direct instructions to banks to freeze the account of a customer without the order of Court,”*** the Appellate Court proceeded to further hold thus:

***“... the judiciary has onerous duty of preserving and protecting the rule of law. The principle of the rule of law are that, both the governor and the governed are subject to rule of law. The Courts must rise to the occasion, speak and frown against arrogant display of powers by an arm of government. It is in the interest of both Government and citizens that law are respected, as respect for the rule of law promotes order, peace and decency in all societies, we are not an exception. Our financial institutions must not be complacent and appear toothless in the face of brazen and reckless violence to the rights of their customers. Whenever there is specific provision regulating the procedure of doing a particular act, that procedure must be followed.”***

The law made specific provision for the procedure to be followed by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent whenever it considers it necessary to place a restriction on a customer's accounts. The law also makes it incumbent on the banks including the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, to ensure that the order or directive they are meant to comply with are made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

It does not lie in the mouth of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents to assert as they did in their respective written addresses, that they are entitled to presume that the order or directive of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent was properly and regularly issued and served on them. They are not entitled to any such presumption. Laying claim to such presumption only amounts to being complacent in protecting the rights of their customers.

For aiding the infringement of the right of the Applicant by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents became parties to that violation of the Applicant's rights.

Among the reliefs claimed by the Applicant in this application is a claim for a declaration that he is entitled to public apology and adequate compensation from the Respondents pursuant to Section 35(6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and an order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent from further inviting, arresting or detaining the Applicant on the petition/complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent.

The provision of the constitution in Section 35(6) for compensation and public apology, relate to where a person was unlawfully arrested or detained. In the instant case, the arrest of the Applicant, pursuant to a lawful complaint of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Respondent, for purposes of investigation of the complaint, was not unlawful. Also, the allegation of unlawful detention by the Applicant was not proved. Therefore, the Applicant in the

circumstances of this case, has not shown that he is entitled to compensation and public apology.

Also, the claim for a perpetual restraining order against the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is misconceived by the Applicant. This Court is not invested with any power to curtail the lawful exercise of the investigative powers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent.

In **A.G. Anambra State v. Chief Uba (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt.947)44**, the Court of Appeal, per Bulkachuwa, JCA, held that:

***“The order of perpetual injunction restraining the appellants is unconstitutional because it is an interference with the powers given by the constitution to police officers to investigate and prosecute crimes... It is indeed trite that no Court has the power to stop the police from investigating a crime... For a person therefore to go to Court to be shielded against criminal investigation and prosecution is an interference with the powers given by the constitution to law officers in the control of criminal investigation”.***

This Court will therefore not exercise the power which it does not have in purporting to restrain the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent from carrying out its lawful function of investigation. The Court will readily come to the aid of the Applicant, and indeed, any citizen, on that citizen's application, where in the exercise of its investigative function, the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent breaches the right of that citizen.

From the totality of the foregoing, this application succeeds in part, and this Court makes the following orders:

1. Relief (1) fails for want of proof, and is accordingly dismissed.

2. It is declared that the continued freezing, restricting, blocking and or placing a Post No Debit on the accounts of the Applicant without a valid order of a Court from July, 2018 till date, and detention of the personal properties of the Applicant without warrant, which were seized from him at the time of his arrest on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2018, till date by the operatives and officials of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a violent violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights.
3. Relief (3) is subsumed in relied (2) above.
4. It is declared that the restrictions placed on the accounts of the Applicant by the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents based on the instructions given to the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents by the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent without any Court order to that effect, thereby denying and depriving the Applicant access to and operation of the said accounts, is illegal, unconscionable, ultra vires, as well as a breach of the Applicant's right to own property as guaranteed by the constitution.
5. The allegation of connivance or conspiracy between 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents, was not proved. Accordingly, relief (5) fails and hereby dismissed.
6. Relief (6) fails for want of proof, and is hereby dismissed.
7. It is declared that the continued confiscation and continued detention of the personal properties of the Applicant without warrant, which were seized from him at the time of his arrest, on 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2018, till date, by the operatives and officers of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent, is illegal, wrongful, unlawful and constitutes a violent violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights.
8. Relief (8) fails and is hereby dismissed.
9. Relief (9) fails and also dismissed.

10. The 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents are by themselves, servants, agents, operatives, detectives, investigating officer(s), ordered to remove the Post No Debit order and any other restrictions on the accounts of the Applicant and make operational forthwith, the accounts of the Applicant domiciled with the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents.
11. Relief (11) fails and is accordingly dismissed.
12. The 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent is hereby ordered to release forthwith to the Applicant, his personal properties, i.e. handset phones with SIM cards, which were seized from him at the time of his arrest by the operatives of the 1<sup>st</sup> Respondent on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2018.
13. Relief (13) fails and is hereby dismissed.
14. The 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay to the Applicant the sum of N3,000,000.00 only as exemplary damages for the wanton and grave violation of the Applicant's fundamental rights.
15. Cost of this action assessed at N1,000,000.00(One Million Naira) against the 1<sup>st</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Respondents.

**HON. JUSTICE A. O. OTALUKA**  
**6/7/2021.**